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Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) has shown inconsistent results as a predictor of beliefs in 
conspiracy theories (CTs). The present investigation attempted to clarify these results by 
separating anti-establishment CTs, which challenge the existing social order, from pro-
establishment CTs, which seek to justify and reinforce it against external threats. In two 
MTurk samples (N = 294, 200), RWA correlated strongly with pro-establishment CTs but 
weakly with anti-establishment CTs. Regression analyses suggest that after controlling for 
exposure to the CTs, this gap in the predictive power of RWA can be explained by 
differences in attitudes toward their alleged perpetrators, highlighting the importance of 
intergroup attitudes as an important driver of CT endorsement. 
 
Scholars have long speculated that conspiracy theories (CTs; allegations regarding 
collusion among powerful actors to achieve sinister ends through deception; Wood, Douglas, 
& Sutton, 2012) are a signature feature of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Although many recent studies have confirmed that 
there is probably a positive correlation between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and 
conspiracy belief, several other investigations have found no association between the two. At 
the moment, there is no obvious reason for these conflicting results (for a review, see 
Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015).  
Some of the issue may lie with imprecise effect size estimates. For example, McHoskey 
(1995) reported an unusual negative correlation between RWA and conspiracy belief, but the 
sample was small (N=33) and the correlation was only significant with an unreported one-
tailed test. Another part of the issue may be psychologists’ tendency to treat conspiracy 
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beliefs as a more or less unitary construct – understandable, as conspiracy belief scales tend 
to load on a single factor, and CT beliefs intercorrelate strongly regardless of their content 
(Sutton & Douglas, 2014). However, while some CTs clearly reinforce the RWA view of the 
world as a threatening place in which survival depends on obedience, adherence to tradition, 
and socially sanctioned aggression against outsiders (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), other CTs 
posit a view of mainstream authorities as corrupt despots who must be disobeyed, and 
traditions as top-down control mechanisms for an unaware public (Byford, 2011) Considering 
these subtypes of CT separately – and recruiting enough participants for more precise effect 
size estimates – might explain some of the divergent results regarding RWA. 
Consistent with this idea, RWA is a relatively consistent positive predictor of so-called 
conspiracy stereotypes – CTs about relatively large outgroups, such as Jews or Russians – but 
is less reliably correlated with beliefs in CTs about specific events or with general conspiracy 
mentality (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015).i With the aim of clarifying 
under what circumstances RWA correlates with particular conspiracy beliefs, we test here 
whether RWA predicts two separate types of relatively specific CT: theories that propose a 
conspiracy among the existing establishment (e.g., governments abusing their power) and 
theories that propose a conspiracy against that establishment (e.g., minority groups conspiring 
against the social order). Authoritarians tend to be vigilant against threats to the stability of 
the current social order and the cohesion of valued ingroups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), so 
RWA should predict stronger agreement with CTs that threaten an ingroup authority. On the 
other hand, CTs that portray the present establishment as corrupt and unworthy of obedience 
should be less appealing to high authoritarians. These relationships should occur 
independently of social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994) which tends to correlate with RWA and has also shown correlations with conspiracy 
beliefs (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015). 
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Participants and Design 
300 participants were initially recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; for 
a discussion of the validity of MTurk data, see Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). After eliminating 
ineligible participants, duplicates, and anyone who took less than 90 seconds, 294 
participants were retained (176 male, 117 female, 1 unspecified) with a mean age of 33.83 
(SD = 11.01). All participants were U.S. residents and had an MTurk approval rate of at least 
90%, and were paid $3 each for their participation. The data were collected during the second 
term of Barack Obama’s presidency. Study 1 was correlational, and measured beliefs in two 
different types of CT, along with RWA and SDO. 
Materials and Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were given three scales in a randomized, 
counterbalanced order. The 30-item RWA scale (α = .96; Altemeyer, 1988) asked participants 
to rate their agreement with statements such as “Obedience is the most important virtue 
children should learn” on a -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The 
SDO scale (α = .96; Pratto et al., 1994) asked participants to rate their feelings on 16 
statements (8 reverse coded), e.g, “Inferior groups should stay in their place,” on a 1 (very 
negative) to 7 (very positive) Likert scale. 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured by agreement on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree) with 7 pro-establishment CTs (e.g., "Many of the foreigners 
coming into this country are here as part of a deliberate plan to radically change our society," 
α = .88) and 7 anti-establishment CTs (e.g., “Those in power are secretly campaigning to 
destroy individual freedom in this country,” α = .90). Following the questionnaires, 
participants were debriefed and paid via MTurk. 
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Pearson correlations between measures can be seen in Table 1. Pro- and anti-
establishment CT beliefs were strongly intercorrelated. The correlation with RWA was 
significantly stronger for pro-establishment than for anti-establishment CT belief, Fisher’s z = 
11.45, p < .001 (Lee & Preacher, 2013). Standard multiple linear regression analyses showed 
that pro-establishment CT belief was significantly predicted by both RWA (β = .41, t(293) = 
7.52, p < .001) and SDO (β = .24, t(293) = 4.36, p < .001). However, anti-establishment CT 
belief was predicted only by SDO (β = .18, t(293) = 2.71, p = .007); RWA was not a 
significant predictor (β = -.005, t(293) = -.29, p = .773). 
Discussion 
As predicted, pro-establishment CT beliefs correlated positively with RWA, and this 
relationship was independent of SDO. Unexpectedly, anti-establishment CT beliefs were 
uncorrelated, rather than negatively correlated, with RWA. 
We expected an RWA/pro-establishment correlation because pro-establishment CTs 
propose a plot to overthrow the existing social order. The prospect of a fifth-column 
subversion of a valued ingroup would threaten authoritarians (just as the potential disruption 
of the status quo presents a salient threat to high social dominators and system justifiers). 
However, CTs generally seem more plausible when they implicate a generally disliked 
outgroup (Radnitz & Underwood, 2015) and when people are repeatedly exposed to them 
(Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010). High RWAs may simply dislike the 
minority or deviant groups who are supposedly behind pro-establishment CTs, or have more 
exposure to these CTs via their cultural milieu. Finally, openness to experience correlates 
negatively with RWA and attitudes toward minority groups, and positively with at least some 
conspiracy beliefs (Swami et al., 2010). A positive relationship between RWA and pro-
establishment CT beliefs might therefore reflect a mutual negative relationship with openness 
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to experience. Study 2 set out to test whether these factors could account for the stronger 
RWA/pro-establishment CT correlation. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and Design 
200 MTurk participants (71 female, 128 male, 1 other; mean age 33.37, SD = 9.58) 
took part in exchange for US$2.00 each. All participants were U.S. residents with an MTurk 
approval rating of at least 90%; none were excluded from analysis. The data were collected 
during the second term of Barack Obama’s presidency. Study 2 followed a correlational 
design.  
Materials and Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were presented with four questionnaires in 
counterbalanced order: the 30-item RWA scale (α = .88), measures of beliefs and exposure to 
the CTs from Study 1, attitudes toward alleged perpetrator groups, and openness to 
experience. 
The belief/exposure measure followed Swami et al. (2010). After rating their agreement 
with each pro- and anti-establishment theory, participants rated on a 7-point Likert scale the 
degree to which they heard about the theory from friends, in rallies, and through various 
media. These items were averaged across each theory type to create a composite exposure 
score. Separately, participants rated their attitudes toward the alleged perpetrators of each CT, 
such as immigrants or corporations, on a 1 (extremely negative) – 7 (extremely positive) 
Likert scale. For anti-establishment theories, agreement α = .86, exposure α = .89, attitudes α 
= .80; for pro-establishment theories, agreement α = .85, exposure α = .88, attitudes α = .69.  
Finally, a 10-item measure of openness to experience was included (α = .83; Goldberg 
et al., 2006). Participants rated how much 10 statements (e.g., “I have a vivid imagination”), 
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2 reverse-coded, applied to them on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) Likert scale. Following 
the questionnaires, participants viewed a debriefing and received their payment as in Study 1. 
Results & Discussion 
RWA correlated strongly and significantly with pro-establishment CT agreement (r = 
.618, p < .001). Unlike Study 1, RWA also correlated with anti-establishment CT agreement 
(r = .245, p < .001), though not as strongly (Fisher’s z = 4.68, p < .001). Agreement with each 
kind of CT correlated very strongly with exposure to it (rs > .70) and moderately with 
attitudes toward the relevant perpetrator groups (rs > .40); see Table 2.  
Contributors to both types of CT were investigated using standard multiple regression 
analyses (see Table 3). Pro-establishment CT agreement was regressed on pro-establishment 
CT exposure, pro-establishment CT perpetrator attitudes, RWA, and openness. The model 
explained the majority of variance in agreement, R2 = .72, with only openness failing to 
contribute a significant proportion of variance, t(195) = -.58, p = .56. Anti-establishment CT 
agreement was likewise regressed on exposure, attitudes, RWA, and openness. This model 
also explained the majority of anti-establishment CT variance, R2 = .63. Only openness was 
not a significant predictor, t(195) = -1.08, p = .28. A cross-model comparison showed no 
significant difference in RWA’s predictive power between the two models (for pro-
establishment, β = .290, SE = .051; for anti-establishment, β = .185, SE = .055; Z = 1.41, p = 
.15). 
General Discussion 
Both studies demonstrated differences in how CTs correlate with authoritarianism. 
Alone or when controlling for SDO, RWA is a stronger predictor of pro-establishment than 
anti-establishment CT belief. This leaves at least two possibilities: first, pro-establishment 
CTs seem more plausible to high authoritarians because they tend to implicate disliked 
outgroups; second, they propose threats to the established social order and ingroup 
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authorities, which high authoritarians are more sensitive to. This type of threat, though not 
measured directly here, is known to be an important determinant of conspiracy theory belief 
(Federico, Williams, & Vitriol, 2018; Jolley, Douglas, & Sutton, 2018). However, Study 2 
suggests that intergroup attitudes are also a likely moderating variable, since much of the gap 
in the predictive power of RWA was eliminated when attitudes toward alleged perpetrator 
groups were taken into account. Indeed, the difference in RWA slopes across regression 
models did not reach significance – though this is not strong evidence against the existence of 
any difference at all, and both RWA slopes were still significantly above zero.  
Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that RWA correlates 
differentially with different types of conspiracy theories. The most parsimonious explanation 
seems to be that individual theories have specific contextual effects that change their 
relationship with ideology-relevant variables like RWA; pro-establishment CTs are reliably 
and strongly associated with RWA, while anti-establishment CTs are not. This, combined 
with some imprecise effect size estimates, has led to a literature with a confusing mix of 
positive, null, and even negative results for the correlation between RWA and anti-
establishment CT beliefs. 
Further research should seek to refine these effect size estimates in larger samples in 
order to explore the relationships between these variables more fully. The connection 
between SDO, RWA, and conspiracy belief will likely depend to some extent on the 
underlying motives of SDO and RWA: the perception of the world as a competitive and 
threatening place, respectively (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Furthermore, the present study’s 
treatment of political authoritarianism is lopsided, with no specific investigation of left-wing 
authoritarianism (LWA; Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017). LWA, in this sample, 
might have predicted anti-establishment attitudes more strongly than RWA did, and could 
also be expected to have matching effects on AECTs. The predictive utility of RWA and 
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LWA for PECT and AECT might vary considerably depending on the political context: 
research has shown that having representatives of one’s ideology in positions of power tends 
to suppress conspiracy belief (Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  
These results complement existing research on the role of intergroup attitudes in 
specific conspiracy beliefs (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2015). One caveat 
is that many CTs have different versions that implicate different perpetrators, methods, and 
goals – 9/11 has been described variously as a power grab by the U.S. establishment (anti-
establishment) or a coup against it (pro-establishment). Which category a given theory falls 
into may depend on whose version is being considered. Other conspiracy theories, such as the 
idea that a political establishment has been entirely subverted by a conspiring outgroup, 
might contain elements of both. Finally, in both studies reported here, the strongest predictor 
of agreement with either CT type was agreement with the other. Generalised conspiracy 
mentality, like RWA or SDO, is an ideological variable, and it carries its own set of 
assumptions that make certain social explanations seem more or less likely (Imhoff & Bruder, 
2014). How conspiracy mentality interacts with other such variables is a fruitful topic for 
further research. 
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 1 2 3 M SD 
1. Pro-establishment conspiracy belief     3.05 1.33 
2. Anti-establishment conspiracy belief .709*    3.92 1.42 
3. Right-wing authoritarianism .524* .064  -23.03 34.73 
4. Social dominance orientation .432* .168* .469*  36.99 19.61 
 
Table 1. Correlations and descriptive statistics in Study 1, N = 294. * p < .05 (Bonferroni-
corrected for k = 6 comparisons).
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD 
1. RWA        -32.44 36.39 
2. Openness -.531*        5.44 1.01 
3. Pro-establishment 
CT agreement 
 .618* -.339*       2.45 1.34 
4. Pro-establishment 
CT exposure 
 .428* -.183  .784*      2.46 1.17 
5. Pro-establishment 
perpetrator attitudes 
-.473*  .434* -.445* -.313*     3.80 0.88 
6. Anti-establishment 
CT agreement 
 .245* -.083  .694*  .565* -.289*    3.32 1.40 
7. Anti-establishment 
CT exposure 
 .160  .047  .570*  .759* -.216  .723*   3.01 1.23 
8. Anti-establishment 
perpetrator attitudes 
 .222* -.135 -.047 -.022  .213 -.406* -.228*  2.84 0.97 
 
Table 2. Correlations between variables in Study 2, N = 200. *p < .05 (Bonferroni-corrected for k = 28 comparisons)  
 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Personality and Individual Differences, available online at  
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886918305221. It is not the copy of record. Copyright © 2018, Elsevier.
15 
 
Outcome Predictor Regression coefficient 
Agreement with pro-
establishment CTs 
Exposure to relevant CTs .623*** 
Attitudes toward perpetrator groups -.101* 
 RWA .290*** 
 Openness to experience -.027 
Agreement with anti-
establishment CTs 
Exposure to relevant CTs .625*** 
Attitudes toward perpetrator groups -.312*** 
 RWA .185** 
 Openness to experience -.056 
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
Table 3. Results of multiple regression analyses predicting beliefs in pro-establishment and 
anti-establishment conspiracy beliefs from exposure, attitudes toward perpetrator groups, 
right-wing authoritarianism, and openness to experience. 
 
                                                          
i Grzesiak-Feldman (2012; as cited in Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015) observed an interaction between RWA and SDO 
whereby RWA predicted conspiracy stereotypes only for low social dominators, but no such interaction was 
observed in the present Study 1 for either pro-establishment or anti-establishment CT belief (ps > .25). 
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Pro- and anti-establishment conspiracy theories scale 
1. A global government will soon seize control of individual nations from their own 
governments. 
2. Those in power will inevitably abuse their positions by conspiring against their own 
people. 
3. Social deviants are plotting to undermine the foundations of Western society. 
4. The 'accidental' deaths of many important public figures are really assassinations 
carried out by world elites in order to keep them silent. 
5. The current state of moral degeneracy is the result of a carefully-planned campaign 
by those who would seek to destroy our way of life. 
6. Corporations and governments routinely falsify or cover up scientific findings to 
serve their own selfish ends. 
7. Certain ethnic and religious minority groups wield a disproportionate amount of 
power in this country, and use that power to covertly push a self-serving political 
agenda. 
8. Those in power are secretly campaigning to destroy individual freedom in this 
country. 
9. There is an active plot to tear down our existing legal system and establish a new one 
based on Sharia Law. 
10. Many so-called 'terrorist attacks' are really orchestrated in secret by governments in 
order to have an excuse to oppress their people. 
11. The people who run the world are constantly searching for ways to control the 
population's actions, speech, and even thoughts. 
12. The silly, pointless stories commonly seen in the mass media are often planted by 
those in power to distract the population from the real problems in society. 
13. Many of the foreigners coming into this country are here as part of a deliberate plan 
to radically change our society. 
14. There is a concerted campaign to dismiss people as racist or sexist simply because 
they express opinions that certain minority groups disagree with. 
Note: Plain text denotes anti-establishment conspiracy theories; italicized text denotes pro-
establishment conspiracy theories. 
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